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Abstract
Using BoardEx (2000–2017), we create a dynamic network connecting firms and
board directors for the United States. We use the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Toxic Release Inventory to measure environmental performance at the director and
firm-level. We examine how a candidate’s environmental performance and networks
affect director appointments. This allows us to endogenize the effect of directors’ envi-
ronmental experience when studying the impact on firms’ chemical releases. We show
that firms are likely to appoint influential directors with good environmental records
and similar characteristics. Further, boards with good environmental performance and
with diverse environmental backgrounds improve firms’ environmental performance.
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1 Introduction
Private firms are increasingly held accountable for their environmental impacts and their
efforts to promote sustainable growth.1 As a result, investors are becoming conscious of the
need for firms to be more ethical and environment-friendly in their business and production
operations. For example, the C.E.O. of BlackRock, Larry Fink, said that BlackRock
would exit certain investments that “present a high sustainability-related risk” and move
more aggressively to vote against management teams that are not making progress on
sustainability (Sorkin, 2020).2
In this paper, we examine how firms internalize this increasing pressure and the role of
directors’ network formation in shaping a firm’s environmental strategy. Directors are ac-
countable to the firm’s shareholders and their main roles include taking the firm’s strategic
and operational decisions. By serving on the board of multiple firms, directors can agglom-
erate useful information from various sources, identify new business practices, and advise
senior management regarding a firm’s environmental strategy. Board directors’ networks
can, therefore, constitute a key element to improve a firm’s environmental performance.
This question has two dimensions.
First, we investigate whether a candidate’s environmental performance is a factor that
firms take into account when they appoint their decision-making board members. A
positive answer implies that, besides other performance measures, firms also value envi-
ronmental performance when determining the suitability of a director for the board. This
leads to our next question: how a firm’s board of directors influences its environmental
performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study whether a
firm considers a candidate’s past environmental record when hiring a board member. By
modelling directors’ network formation (through the appointment process), we endogenize
the effect of directors’ environmental experience when examining their network influence
over firms’ environmental performance.
To complete our analysis, we compile one of the most comprehensive director-firm
level data files ever assembled on environmental performance and board characteristics
and networks. We combine data from BoardEx data for North America, the United States
(US) Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program,
1A striking example of this increasing pressure on companies is the judgment from a district court in
The Hague (Netherlands) that ordered Royal Dutch Shell to reduce its CO2 emissions by 45% from 2019
levels, in line with global climate goals (May 2021). This was the first time a court ruled that a large
polluting company must comply with the Paris Climate Agreement.
2Another example of this trend is the recent removal of two directors from ExxonMobil following
pressure from an activist investor, Engine No. 1, regarding ExxonMobil’s climate strategy (CNN, 2021).
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and the US Census between 2000 and 2017. We build a dynamic firm-director network
for North America using information provided by BoardEx, a global data company that
compiles public information on board directors and senior management of publicly listed
and large private companies.
To obtain measures of firms’ and directors’ environmental performance, we match
BoardEx data with the TRI. The TRI is a national database, established by law, which
requires private and government facilities to report annually their pollution prevention
activities and how much of certain chemicals they emit into the air or water or send
to landfills. The TRI Program currently covers 770 individual chemicals that typically
have significant adverse human health and environmental effects. In this study, a firm’s
environmental performance is measured by its facilities’ polluting probabilities and the
total sum of pollutants released (measured in toxic pounds). We define a board member’s
environmental performance by calculating the proportion of their connections to polluting
facilities within a firm relative to all connected facilities among firms in the network
during the previous period. By using a quantitative measure of pollution, i.e. firms’ toxic
chemical releases, we take into account directors actual actions or impacts in all the firms
he is serving as a board member.
We start our analysis by examining the directors’ network formation, using a Bayesian
model approach similar to Christakis et al. (2020) and De Silva et al. (2020). Our results
indicate that firms tend to appoint directors who share more similarities (captured by
pollution-related homophily measures) with existing board members or to the firm itself.
Candidates who have greater network influence have a significantly higher chance of being
appointed, while candidates with poorer environmental performances are less welcome even
if they are influential. This could be due to consideration about the firms’ reputation and
regulation risk. If an influential director with a ‘toxic’ environmental record is appointed
to a firm, the firm can face criticism from the public and draw the attention of regulators,
which can indirectly affect profits. We also find that firms with higher network influence
tend to appoint more directors to their boards and directors with long market exposures
are more likely to be appointed.
We, then, turn to the second dimension of our problem, i.e., the influence of directors
on their firm’s environmental performance. As firms very often own more than one facil-
ity in the US, we examine facility-level outcomes and exploit the panel structure of our
data. We estimate the board’s influence on a facility’s polluting probability by adopting a
probit model and on the total toxic release by using simple linear and censored regression
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techniques. The influence of board members over their firm is measured by the average
of all existing board directors’ environmental performance. We also control for location-
specific demographic (and geographic) characteristics to control for factors that can affect
a facility’s location and pollution decisions using US Census data. Our findings suggest
that a facility’s or firm’s environmental performance is significantly affected by its board
directors’ previous experience. When a boardroom has a higher ratio of directors with
poor pollution records, the facilities controlled by this board tend to have more polluting
incidents. Further, our analysis shows that a facility controlled by a more diverse board
in terms of environmental performance tends to pollute less.
Combining the results from the two analyses, our study shows that the board of di-
rectors has a role to play in the move towards more sustainable growth. As firms are
under increasing pressure (from consumers or regulatory agencies) to be environmentally
responsible, we show that the board of directors and its network is a key determinant
in improving a firm’s environmental performance through their involvement in a firm’s
strategic decisions and values definition. Despite the likelihood that firms will appoint
directors who are similar to their existing board directors, they also tend to appoint envi-
ronmentally conscious and influential directors to their boards. This move can improve a
firm’s overall environmental performance.
There exists an extensive literature on the role of the board of directors. Studies
suggest that directors should use their own information, experience, and other resources to
proactively help decision-making (Chen et al., 2009; Kroll et al., 2008). Given the strategic
nature of environmental sustainability, directors have a clear role to play in this area and
a growing literature connects board directors’ characteristics and firms’ environmental
performance. Previous research has focused on directors’ legal expertise (De Villiers et al.
2011; McKendall et al. 1999), specific environmental expertise based on their roles or their
presence in environmental sub-committees in other boards (Homroy and Slechten 2019),
or political and academic experience (Zhuang et al. 2018). Similarly, the existence of a
corporate social responsibility (CSR)-focused committee significantly improves a firm’s
environmental performance (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017;
Garćıa Mart́ın and Herrero, 2020). We add to this literature by considering a measure
of directors’ environmental performance, based on their actual past actions or impacts.
Board diversity is another key factor improving board effectiveness and its importance
has been recognized by the European Commission (Commission, 2012). The existing
literature shows a positive relationship between a board’s gender diversity and its firm’s
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environmental performance (Post et al., 2011; Lu and Herremans, 2019). Age/generational
diversity improves a firm’s information richness, experience, and knowledge in a team,
thereby improving its CSR performance (Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015). In this paper, we
create a measure of board diversity in terms of environmental performance and show that
it positively affects the firm’s environmental performance.
Our paper also contributes to the literature examining the effects of board connections.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that directors can facilitate the firms’ access to external
resources and information. There is evidence of an association between board connections
and firm value (Fracassi and Tate 2012; Zona et al. 2018). Studies also indicate that
board connections affect M&A transactions (Cai and Sevilir 2012) or innovation (Chuluun
et al. 2017). In the same spirit, board directors’ networks can constitute a key element
to improve a firm’s environmental performance. Ortiz-de Mandojana et al. (2012) find
that having a well-connected board tends to increase the probability of adopting proactive
environmental strategies. Homroy and Slechten (2019) study the role of shared directorship
in firms’ pollutant releases in the United Kingdom and find that directors with specific
environmental experience leverage their network connections on environmental issues. A
key distinction of our paper is the fact that we do not take the director network as given,
but empirically model the director appointment process. Additionally, we are not only
studying how well connected a director is, but also how ‘toxic’ their connections are.
Finally, the network we use for our analysis consists of all firms, regardless of their size,
in North America (and not only publicly listed ones as in Homroy and Slechten 2019 or
large firms as in Walls et al. 2012).
Networks are widely used in the Finance literature to represent the interdependencies
between organizations in the finance sector (Jackson and Pernoud, 2019, 2020). Lux (2015)
provides a dynamic model of interbank credit connections and demonstrates that network
formations are random at first but develop preferential relationships due to a learning
mechanism. Our paper adds to this literature by considering the role of environmental
performance in director network formation.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our conceptual
framework. We present the datasets and explain how we combine them to perform our
analysis in Section 3. Section 4 lays out the empirical models for both network formation
and network influence studies. In the final section, we conclude and discuss the implica-
tions of our findings.
4
2 Conceptual framework
Firms interact with many stakeholders (consumers, employees, shareholders, regulators,
etc.) who may be endowed with social, environmental, or ethical preferences. Profit-
maximizing firms cannot ignore such preferences as they directly affect the demand for
their product, the supply of labor, and/or future social/environmental regulations (Casadesus-
Masanell et al., 2009; Turban and Greening, 1997; Eichholtz et al., 2010; Maxwell et al.,
2000). Achieving a good environmental performance can become part of a firm’s profit
maximization strategy.
The board of directors is a key component in corporate governance. The board repre-
sents the interests of the shareholders and is primarily tasked with monitoring and advising
senior management.3 With respect to the advisory role, board directors create firm value
by using their own information, experience, and other resources to proactively help strate-
gic and operational decision making and determining the values to be promoted throughout
the company (Kroll et al., 2008). Resource and information provision is crucial in the con-
text of environmental sustainability as improving environmental performance may require
the adoption of new business practices or large investments new environmentally efficient
technologie with uncertain long-term returns.
As pointed out by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), board
directors’ networking with the external environment is a key element in their ability to
increase firm value. Directors’ social capital emerges from their relations with other firms’
directors and outside individuals (Walls et al., 2012) and provides channels of communica-
tion and information that help in acquiring outside resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
By sharing directorship in different companies, directors are exposed to various environ-
mental strategies or investment opportunities and can exchange ideas and information
related to good environmental practices. This might give them a comparative advantage
in their advisory role.
To examine the role of directors’ network formation in shaping a firm’s environmental
strategy, we consider a network where directors and firms are nodes. A link between a
director and a firm implies that this director is serving on the board of the firm. Figure
1 provides an example of a network where we focus on two directors (red nodes). The
3Under state corporate law, shareholders generally have the right to elect directors at the annual
shareholder meeting (sections 211 and 216 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, for example). The
board generally nominates director candidates. Companies also adopt bye-laws authorizing the board to
elect directors to fill board vacancies and newly created directorships. However, this eliminates a key
shareholder power to ensure that directors act in their best interests.
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brown and green nodes represent firms, while the blue nodes represent the other directors
serving on the boards of those firms. Firms are characterized by their environmental per-
formance. In the example, the green (respectively brown) nodes represent firms with good
(respectively poor) environmental performance. In our setting, a director’s environmental
performance will be a function of the past environmental performance of the firms they are
connected to. In Figure 1, both directors have two ‘pollution links’ as they are connected
to two firms with poor environmental performance. However, one director is serving on
the board of three firms, while the other director is connected to seven firms. The director
with seven connections will, therefore, be considered as having a better environmental
performance.
In our analysis, we first investigate the directors’ network formation. The appointment
of a board member represents the formation of a link between a director and a firm. In
each period t, a firm will determine the suitability of a director for the board. A firm can
appoint more than one director to its board and hiring decisions are independent of each
other. Applicants are eligible to apply for and hold multiple positions simultaneously. If
achieving good environmental performance is part of the firm’s objective, we can make
the following testable hypothesis:
Testable hypothesis 1: Appointing a new candidate director or continuing with an existing
candidate in period t depends on the candidate’s past environmental performance (in period
t− 1).
Westphal and Zajac (2013) note that existing directors tend to favor colleagues who
have more similarities (homophily) on major demographic characteristics. The same rea-
soning can be applied to environmental performance:
Testable hypothesis 2: Firms tend to appoint directors sharing more similarities in terms
of their environmental performance with existing board members.
In addition, board directors with more social capital are able to gain greater influence
within their boards. They will also have more opportunities to leverage their network to
provide information and resources to advise senior management.
Testable hypothesis 3: We expect that firms will be willing to hire directors who are better
connected.
Once directors are appointed, they will shape the firm’s environmental strategy based
on their own past environmental experience and the information they can leverage from
6
their networks. This leads to our next question: How does a firm’s board of directors
influence its environmental performance. Directors make collective decisions for their
firms. These decisions will affect all its facilities’ environmental performance.
Testable hypothesis 4: A facility environmental performance will reflect the average envi-
ronmental performance of the directors on its board.
The literature following the seminal paper by Lazear (1998) also suggests that diver-
sity in skills and education may generate knowledge spillover among the employees within
a firm, which positively affects firm performance. The same argument could apply to
board diversity in terms of environmental performance. Differences in environmental per-
formance reflect different experience or exposure to different environmental issues, which
might generate some information spillovers within the board.
Testable hypothesis 5: Board diversity (in terms of environmental performance) will im-
prove a facility environmental performance.
3 Data
The data used in this analysis combine three main sources for the period between 2000
and 2017. Facility-level pollution data are taken from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
Program. The director-firm-level data for all reporting US (United States) companies are
gathered from BoardEx. Census tract-level data are collected from the US Census Bureau.
Note that, while TRI and Census data are publicly available, BoardEx data are not
publicly available. We are able to access BoardEx data under the terms of a non-disclosure
agreement and interested researchers can access or purchase these data from BoardEx.4
3.1 TRI data
TRI data provide information regarding a facility’s environmental performance. The TRI
Program, administrated by the EPA, is a resource for learning about toxic chemical releases
and pollution prevention activities reported by private and federal facilities. The origins of
the TRI Program date back to the Union Carbide chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India
on December 4, 1984 and a similar serious chemical release at another Union Carbide plant
in West Virginia in 1985. As a response to these disasters, the US Congress passed the




of the EPCRA was to support and promote emergency planning and to provide the public
with information about pollution prevention activities and releases of toxic chemicals in
their community. Section 313 of the EPCRA established the TRI. One of the objectives of
TRI data is to support informed decision-making by communities, government agencies,
companies, and others.
To be included in the TRI Program, a facility needs to meet three criteria. First,
the facility should belong to an industry sector that is covered by the TRI Program.
Second, it should employ 10 or more full-time equivalent employees. Third, the plant
should manufacture, process, or otherwise use a TRI-listed chemical in the quantities
above the threshold levels each year. Note that the facility must prepare and submit a
TRI reporting form for each chemical for which the reporting requirement is triggered.
The TRI Program currently covers 770 individual chemicals that typically have significant
adverse human health and environmental effects.
In our analysis, we include all mandatory TRI reporting plants in the US. Note that
TRI reporters are not necessarily polluters, i.e. they are not necessarily reporting toxic
chemical releases. The TRI Program specifies that a facility has to report a release when
this facility exceeds the minimum chemical release reporting requirements. This require-
ment is expressed in toxicity levels. Hence, a facility reports all chemical releases by total
toxicity levels and not by the amount of chemical released. Further, TRI data provide in-
formation about a facility’s geo-coded address, parent firm (if applicable), and the industry
sector.
In Tables A.1 and A.2, we report the summary statics for TRI data. In Table A.1,
we observe 42, 212 unique facilities from 19, 915 firms in 30 industry sectors from 2000 to
2017. In our analysis, we use the sum of all pollutants’ toxicity per facility given by the
EPA. The average amount of toxicity released by a facility is 124, 680 pounds. Further,
approximately 80% of the facilities released pollutants at least once over our sample period.
The yearly breakdown of the unique number of facilities, firms, and average toxicity release
is shown in Table A.2. On average, there are about 35, 000 facilities per year (Table A.2).
3.1.1 Facility- and firm-level environmental performance
To conduct our analysis, we construct measures of environmental performance at facility-
and firm-level using TRI data. One advantage of using TRI data is that they constitute a
quantitative and comparable measure of environmental performance as opposed to score-
based measures like ESG (Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance) standards.
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Additionally, these score-based measures are typically available for listed firms only, while
TRI reports are filled by all facilities meeting reporting requirements. This implies that
we can study and compare the environmental performance of listed and non-listed firms
and firms with or without a board. It is also important to mention that the information
about firms’ toxic releases and waste management practices are made publicly available
by the EPA and is subject to comprehensive coverage in the media and by the regulators.
Studies show that investors are paying attention to the information from the TRI. There
is evidence that companies incurred negative stock returns following the disclosure of the
TRI and following media coverage of their toxic releases (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna et al.,
1998).
We create measures of environmental performance at the facility- and firm-level. The
first facility-level measure is a dummy variable, pollute, which takes the value 1 in a given
year if the facility reports a release of toxic chemicals above the reporting threshold to the
TRI, and zero otherwise. Our measure of environmental performance at the firm-level,
polluting ratio, is defined as the proportion of facilities whose releases are above the TRI
reporting threshold relative to all its facilities in a given year. Secondly, we use the facility’s
total toxic releases in a given year. Further, summing up all facilities’ toxic releases by
industry, we construct an industry-level total release per year (for the industries identified
in the TRI data). This will allow us to control for industrial heterogeneity in our analysis.
In Table A.1, we can see that the average probability that a facility pollutes (i.e.
reports a toxic release) is about 53%. At the firm-level, the average proportion of facilities
reporting a release within a firm is about 43%. In Table A.3, we present summary statistics
by industry sector. The metal mining industry is the most polluting sector while the
publishing industry is the cleanest sector among the industry sectors based on average
toxicity releases per facility.
3.2 BoardEx
To create a director-firm-level network, we use information provided by BoardEx, a global
data management firm that specializes in relationship mapping and intelligence. BoardEx
data contain more than 2 million profiles of public, private, and not-for-profit organizations
and more than 1.5 million people around the globe. Director and firm profiles available in
BoardEx include high-level details about the company board structure along with current,
upcoming, and historic executives. Other details include important adviser information
and a list of other key senior management. These in-depth profiles show the relationships
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between and among individuals as well as firms. Each person in the database is individually
researched by BoardEx because they are connected at a senior level with a major company.
Further, BoardEx firm-level data contain the information on firms’ directors, directors’
start dates and end dates, firm types, and industry sectors. BoardEx updates the data
within 24 hours of the point of disclosure.6
In our study, we use the BoardEx dataset for North America. The North America
BoardEx data provide the US director network but also capture part of the international
director network as well. This is due to the fact that some multinational firms con-
duct business activities in North America. Note that we focus only on directors who are
decision-making board members because our objective is to evaluate how the board of
directors can influence a firm’s environmental strategy.
In Tables A.4 and A.5, we provide summary statistics for the firms reported in the
North American BoardEx data. Between 2000 and 2017, we observe 119, 607 unique
directors in 157, 997 firms. On average, a firm has about 2.5 directors. On average,
directors’ market exposure is about 10.6 years while their term in a firm is about 5.6
years. Their probability of being associated with a polluting firm (i.e., a firm that has at
least one facility reporting a toxic release to the TRI Program) is about 4.9%. With these
data, we create a firm-director network for the whole US that we will use in the empirical
analysis.
In Table A.5, we report the unique number of firms and directors by year. Despite the
increase in the number of firms, the average number of directors per firm decreases over
the years. This suggests that these directors are serving on more boards and that firms
are likely to become better connected.
3.3 The US Census Tracts
Next, we collect US census tract information published by the United States Census Bu-
reau to control for plant locations’ demographic characteristics. Census tracts are rela-
tively small and permanent statistical subdivisions of a county during census years. The
minimum population of a tract is 1, 200 and the maximum is 8, 000. Given that our data
span two census periods, we consider 2010 locations as fixed geographic locations. From
the census data, we gather information regarding tract-level population density, minority
ratio (i.e. proportion of non-wite population), proportion of individuals with higher edu-
cation (college degree), and median household income for all available years. Our dataset
6see, https://www.boardex.com/. Further, note that BoardEx is a subscription-based service.
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includes all tracts in the US (73, 082 tracts), including tracts with military installations
that do not report demographic information. We denote these tracts as special tracts.
Note that, prior to 2007, census data did not report estimates by year. As in De Silva
et al. (2016) and De Silva et al. (2021), we linearly impute and estimate the missing data
to estimate the population density, minority ratio, proportion of individuals with a college
degree, and median household income from 2000 to 2008.7
We report these summary statistics for all tracts in Table A.6. On average, a tract
has a population of 4,133 and a population density of 5,165 per square mile. Each tract
has about 1,040 households and the median household income is about $64,000. For a
given tract, on average, the minority ratio is about 24% while the college-educated ratio
is about 26%. Additionally, we identify tracts that are located along the Canadian and
Mexican borders and tracts that are located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA),
urban counties, rural counties, and coastal counties.
3.4 Matching TRI, BoardEx, and Census data
To conduct our analysis, we match the TRI and BoardEx datasets. This matching is not
a trivial task because the two datasets are created separately and firms can be recorded
under different names. We start by directly matching the TRI facilities (for which we
have the name of the parent company) with the BoardEx firms by firm name. This
method can only match parts of the two datasets. We, therefore, take advantage of the
additional information provided by BoardEX to increase the accuracy and the proportion
of matched facilities (previous company names, firms’ addresses, contact details, websites,
board structure).
This approach allows us to tackle three major challenges. First, firms can change
name. For example, 3M Co. was Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing co. prior to 2002.
BoardEx also has public listing information including IPO dates and/or delisting dates.
Advanced Disposal Services Inc. was listed in 2016 and its name was changed from Ads
Waste Holdings Inc prior to its public listing. Second, using the merging and acquisition
information provided by BoardEx, we were able to match TRI facilities to their correct
firm in BoardEx. This is particularly useful as some TRI facilities fail to update their
parent companies due to changes in ownership. For example, Forest River Inc. was
acquired by Berkshire Hathaway in 2005 and some of its facilities were still reporting their
7Before imputation, the average population size is 4, 275, the average white population is 3, 257, the
average population with a college degree is 664, and the average median household income is $67, 834.22.
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parent company as Forest River Inc. after 2005 instead of Berkshire Hathaway. Finally,
the information available in BoardEx enables us to match subsidiaries with their parent
firms. For example, Volkswagen AG and Volkswagen Group of America are recorded in
the TRI dataset as two different parent companies, but Volkswagen Group of America is
controlled by Volkswagen AG. Therefore, in our analysis, we consider the facilities from
Volkswagen Group of America as being part of Volkswagen AG.
It might be the case that, for a given year, a firm appears in one dataset but not in
the other.8 The next step consists in filling in the missing years based on a firm’s (or
director’s) first and last appearance in both datasets. This step is based on the rationale
that, if a firm exists in one dataset for a given year, this firm should also exist in the other
for that same year. Once the TRI facilities are matched with their parent firms’ board
information gathered from the BoardEx data, we use the facilities’ geo codes to find their
location in a tract and obtain their local demographic information. Using this method, we
are able to match 2, 895 TRI-reporting firms with at least one board director recorded in
BoardEx from 2000 to 2017. These firms are responsible for the daily operations of 19,099
different TRI-reporting facilities.
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics for observations used in the facility-level
environmental performance analysis. In this analysis, we use environmental performance
data between 2001 and 2017 and all explanatory variables are lagged, which implies that
we lose all facilities that are observed only once during the sample period. Hence, in our
analysis sample, we have 2,873 TRI-reporting firms with at least one board director. These
firms account for about 46% of all TRI-reporting facilities and each firm has about 6.5
facilities. We also observe 16,162 firms without a board member that have 22,063 facilities.
These non-board member firms have about 1.4 facilities per firm. This indicates that firms
with board members are large firms with five times more facilities per firm compared to
non-board member TRI-reporting firms. Note that these TRI-reporting firms are located
in 18,183 tracts out of the 73,082 tracts defined by 2010 US Census data.
8For example, private firms in the BoardEx data do not have to continuously report board information
as private firms do not require to disclose their board structures. Missing data are also common in BoardEx
data in early years where they report only the board members’ start and end years. Submitting a TRI
report is a federal requirement for firms meeting the reporting criteria. However, it might be the case
that for some period of time a firm does not meet all these requirements and does not need to report (for
example, if it has less than 10 full-time employees).
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3.5 Director network and environmental performance
Using the information from BoardEx (see Tables A 4 and A.5 for summary statistics), we
build a network in which directors and firms are nodes and the appointment of a board
member represents the formation of a link between this director and the firm. Figures
1 and 2 present a sub-network of the two most influential directors (determined by their
eigenvector centrality measures) among all directors who are connected to at least one firm
in the TRI dataset (green and brown nodes) in 2017. The blue nodes represent the other
directors in the network. Firms in the network are characterized by their environmental
performance based on the information from the TRI dataset. Brown nodes represent firms
that have at least one toxic release, while green nodes represent firms without any toxic
releases. Figure 1 only shows nodes which are no further than two edges from the most
influential directors (red nodes). When allowing more distanced nodes in the graph, the
size increases exponentially. Figure 2 includes all nodes that are within a distance of four
from any of the two most influential directors. The number of nodes increases by 1,316,
and the number of edges increases by 1,815 compared to Figure 1.
3.5.1 Director-level environmental performance
To capture a director’s environmental performance, we use two different measures that
depend on the past environmental performance of all the firms a director is connected
to, whether they are reporting toxic releases to the TRI or not. First, the director-level
polluting ratio is constructed as the ratio of the total number of polluting facilities relative
to the total number of plants of which they are a board member in the previous year. Next,
we use degree centrality (i.e., the number of direct links) to create a measure of directors’
environmental performance. Note that, as mentioned earlier, we use the full network
(based on BoardEx data) to compute the centrality measures and not only the network
of directors and firms matched with the TRI data. Instead of using the degree centrality
measure directly, we calculate the proportion of ‘pollution links’ relative to their total links,
denoted as relative pollution degree centrality. We define ‘pollution links’ as the number of
connections that a director has to firms that had at least one toxic releasing facility in the
previous year. This measure provides a director’s overall environmental performance and
captures a director’s involvement in the polluting firms relative to their involvement in all
companies. In Figure 1, the top two directors have degree centrality measures of seven
and three. Both directors have two ‘pollution links’ as they are connected to two firms
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with at least one toxic releasing facility in the previous year. However, the director with a
degree centrality of seven will be considered as having a better environmental performance
as relative pollution degree centrality is two out of seven, compared to two out of three
for the other director.
3.5.2 Network influence
To capture director- and firm-level network influence, we use eigenvector centrality. Eigen-
vector is a centrality measure that captures a node’s influence based on the pattern of the
entire network. A value of one for the eigenvector centrality measure represents the most
influential director (or firm) in the entire network at a given time. Those directors and
firms with scores of zero are isolated nodes–not connected to any other firm or director. A
director’s eigenvector centrality is based on the centrality of their first-degree connections.
In other words, a director will be influential (i.e., have a high score for the eigenvector
centrality) if they are connected to well-connected directors.
3.5.3 Director-firm level homophily measures
To test our prediction that firms will appoint directors sharing more similarities with
existing board members, we identify three homophily measures: 1) the difference in a
director’s relative pollution degree centrality with respect to board members’ average
relative pollution degree centrality, 2) the difference in a director’s pollution ratio with
respect to the firm’s pollution ratio, and 3) the difference in a director’s influence and the
firm’s influence.
3.5.4 Board Diversity
The last prediction in our conceptual framework, was that once appointed, board di-
versity in terms of environmental record might positively affect a firm’s environmental
performance. Based on the director-level relative pollution degree centrality, we create a
measure to capture a board’s diversity in terms of environmental performance. The board
range is defined as the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the directors’
relative pollution degree centrality.
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4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis is divided into two parts. We first examine how firms appoint their
board directors. In particular, we investigate whether firms value directors’ past environ-
mental performance when determining their suitability for the board. Second, we show,
once appointed, how these board directors influence firms’ environmental performance.
4.1 Director appointments
In the first part of our analysis, we study directors’ network formation through the board
appointment process. The appointment of a board member represents the formation of a
link between a board member (d) and a firm (j). Hence, our dependent variable is equal to
1 if a firm, in time period (year) t, forms a link with a director and 0 otherwise. To study
whether directors’ environmental performance is a key determinant of a firm’s board ap-
pointment decisions, we model the probability, Pr(ld,j,t|Rd,t−1, Nd,j,t−1, g(Nt−1), Dd,t−1; θt),
of a link ld,j,t established by firm j to director d at time t as a function of an unknown vec-
tor of parameters denoted by θt. A director’s past environmental performance is denoted
by R. We use the observed data of the structure of the network N (e.g. director’s and
firm’s influence). We also control for the homophily measures between potential directors
and firms (g(Nd,j,t−1)). We consider director market exposure D, which is a proxy for
director experience and is computed as the number of years since a director’s first appear-
ance in the BoardEx data at a given time. We postulate a prior distribution for θ. Then,
we derive the posterior distribution for θt and calculate the probability of link formation
for different values of Rd,t−1, Nd,j,t−1, g(Nd,j,t−1), and Dd,t−1.




Pr(ld,j,t|Rd,t−1, Nd,j,t−1, g(Nd,j,t−1), Dd,t−1; θt)




t−1β+(g(Nd,t−1−Nj,t−1)′Ψ(g(Nd,t−1−Nj,t−1)))+ δDd,t−1 + τt + εd,j,t
(1)
where the term (g(Nd,t−1−Nj,t−1)′Ψ(g(Nd,t−1−Nj,t−1))) is the disutility (cost) of having
a difference in homophily between potential director candidates which relates to firm j
in period t − 1 (see Christakis et al. (2020) for a similar measure of homophily). Ψ is
a diagonal matrix. The function g is a measure of homophily that is expressed as the
15
absolute value of the difference in environmental performance between director candidates
and/or firms. We assume that the εd,j,t are independent across all j and d at a given time,
t, and that they follow a logistic distribution.
If the links are independent of each other, then this would be a standard logistic
regression. However, the purpose of exploring a network structure is to account for in-
terdependencies among directors and firms. Therefore, in the link formation analysis,
following Jackson (2010) and Christakis et al. (2020), we exploit the latest developments
in Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods to generate different network-related
posterior distributions for any given specification of parameter based on prior information
on link-formation choices. Specifically, we use a Bayesian MCMC technique based on a
hybrid Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with Gibbs sampling updates to estimate our pos-
terior mean and posterior standard deviations. In this way, one can search over the set of
parameter estimates to find one that leads to the highest likelihood of getting a network
distribution that looks similar to the observed network-related distribution.9
Further, the Bayesian approach offers several advantages. First, it continuously up-
dates posterior estimates given prior information on link formation and network character-
istics. Second, the MCMC gives us the finite-sample properties of the resulting estimates
rather than asymptotic approximations. Additionally, incorporating a non-parametric as-
sumption on the posterior distribution makes the specification of the model more flexible
and, hence, the results are more robust (Li and Zheng, 2009).
Based on the predictions of our conceptual framework, we expect that directors with
cleaner environmental records and influential directors are highly sought out by firms.
Also, directors with similar environmental performances are more likely to connect with
each other. Further, more experienced directors are expected to be more likely to form a
link.
4.1.1 Pool of candidates for the director network formation
In any given period, the firm makes a decision to appoint new directors or renew directors
from its preferred pool of ‘applicants’ (directors). Applicants are eligible to apply for and
hold multiple positions simultaneously. A firm can appoint more than one director to its
board and hiring decisions are independent of each other. Firms make final decisions on
their candidates and hire them simultaneously for a given year.
Potential candidates have to be in the reach of this firm, which is determined by their
9Gelman (2004) provides a detailed description of the Bayesian method used in this paper.
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positioning in the network. Moreover, as in any job opening, firms will make an initial
selection of potential candidates based on homophily measures. To identify these potential
pools of candidates, we take the following steps. First, for each firm, we construct the
maximum difference in the relative pollution degree centrality (with respect to other board
members’ average relative pollution degree centrality) a director has had from 2000 to 2017
with its board. Similarly, we measure the maximum difference between all the appointed
directors’ polluting ratio and the firm’s polluting ratio during the sample period. Then, we
consider all candidates that fall within either of these two maximum values as a potential
candidate for a given board. Based on these cut-offs, we identify a possible 8,487,170
director-firm pairs for all TRI-reporting firms with directors for all years. On average,
this corresponds to about 300 potential candidates per firm in a given year. We use this
sample in our network formation analysis.
One potential concern with our measures of environmental performance and homophily
is that they could capture industry expertise. For example, directors currently serving on
the board of chemical companies will have a greater exposure to polluting facilities and
poorer environmental performance than directors in less polluting sectors. Other firms in
the chemical industry might want to hire those directors for their expertise, rather than
their similarities in terms of environmental performance. To address this issue, for all the
directors matched with at least one TRI firm, we compute the number of TRI-reporting
firms and the number of non-TRI-reporting firms a director serves as a board member. On
average a director is connected to 3 TRI-reporting firms and 3 non-TRI-reporting firms.
Moreover, looking more closely at the TRI sectors (3-digit NAICS code) only, a director
is on average connected to TRI-reporting firms from 4 different sectors. Note that a firm
can be in more than one sector.
4.1.2 Network formation analysis
For empirical link-formation analysis, as mentioned, we used a Bayesian hybrid Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm with Gibbs sampling updates to obtain posterior values for each net-
work parameter based on prior information on link-formation choices. This is similar to
Christakis et al. (2020) and De Silva et al. (2020). Further, we take advantage of the full
dataset instead of taking random draws from the samples.10
Our analysis of link formation focuses on one side of the market (the director market).
10Note that this is computationally demanding. We use Lancaster University’s High Performance Com-
puter to estimate these Bayesian models.
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Firms decide to appoint directors to their boardrooms. As a result, directors are considered
passive actors in our setting, exerting no decision power with respect to the link formation.
We use uniform priors for the regression coefficients and an inverse-gamma prior with
shape and scale parameters of 0.1 and 0.1 for the error variance. In all our Bayesian
estimates, we use 10,000 iterations and omit the first 2,500 to mitigate possible start-up
effects. However, one must verify the convergence of MCMC before making any inferential
conclusions about the obtained results. In our exercise, we observe that the posterior
distribution looks normal. Further, the kernel density estimates based on the first and
second halves of the sample are very similar to each other and are close to the overall
density estimate.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the Bayesian estimation.
Column 1 presents summary statistics for all 2,873 firms with directors, while Column
2 provides information for 661 listed firms with directors. Listed companies with shares
traded on an official stock exchange might be more responsive to the increasing pressure
to become environmentally responsible. The data are for all potential directors matched
with a given firm in a given year. On average, the unconditional probability of a director
and a firm forming a direct link is 1.9%. On average, a director’s past pollution ratio
is 0.446. Considering homophily measures, the absolute difference in a director’s relative
pollution degree centrality with respect to other board members’ average relative pollution
degree centrality is 0.324. Similar inferences could be made for other homophily measures
as well. Further, a director’s average exposure in BoardEx is about 5.5 years.
Table 3 presents the means and credible intervals of the posterior distributions of
our model parameters for all the firms in our sample (Column 1) and for listed firms
only (Column 2).11 In Columns 1 and 2, the mean of the posterior distribution is about
0.1 and the 95% credible interval for the director’s influence lies strictly in a positive
range of values. This result indicates that firms tend to connect with influential directors.
However, on average, if an influential director has a poor environmental performance, firms
would tend to refrain from connecting with him or her. This observation is consistent
with our testable hypotheses 1 and 3 and can be derived from the fact that, in both
specifications, the mean of the posterior distribution of a director’s past pollution ratio
interacted with the director’s influence is strictly negative. Finally, influential firms tend
11Note that we do not include a listed dummy (and its interactions with all other variables) in our
director-firm level estimations because this dummy variable would be highly correlated with a firm’s eigen-
vector centrality. Listed firms are usually large and, as a result, have larger boards (with more connections)
and higher eigenvector centrality.
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to connect with more directors as they tend to have more board members. The mean
of the posterior distribution for a director’s past pollution ratio is negative, but it lies
strictly in the negative range only for the listed companies. This is in line with previous
research analyzing investor reactions to public disclosure of TRI. Khanna et al. (1998)
show that listed firms in the chemical industry incurred statistically significant negative
stock market returns following the publication of TRI data, and that these losses had a
significant impact on their subsequent toxic releases. It illustrates that listed companies
might be more responsive to the increasing pressure to become environmentally responsible
by hiring directors with a good environmental record.
Considering homophily measures, our results are in line with our second testable hy-
pothesis and indicate that an increase in the differences in a director’s relative pollution
degree centrality with respect to that of other existing board members decreases the prob-
ability of their being appointed as a board member. This probability is also lower when
the differences in a director’s pollution ratio and influence with respect to the firm in-
crease. As expected, exposure in the market increases the probability of being appointed
as a director.12
4.2 Network influence on environmental performances
Having discussed the determinants of network formation, we empirically investigate how
the features of a network and a firm’s boardroom characteristics affect pollution probabil-
ities and toxic releases. The posterior estimates for all firms in our sample from Table 3
(Column 1) will be used to calculate director-firm-level network formation probabilities.
This will allow us to address endogeneity concerns related to the use of the actual number
of direct director-firm links in the firm-level environmental performance analysis.
4.2.1 Facility-level probability of pollution
Our dependent variable, pollutef,i,j,l,t, takes the value 1 if facility f , belonging to firm
j in sector i and located in tract l, releases any pollutants at time t; otherwise, it is 0.
Our main variable of interest is the board’s past environmental performance (denoted by
B) which is measured using the board’s past average pollution ratio and the range of
the board’s relative pollution degree centrality. Recall that pollution ratio captures the
board’s past environmental performance while the range of the board’s relative pollution
12Considering the goodness of fit of the Bayesian estimates, the trace plot of the constant demonstrates
good mixing. The posterior distribution of the constant is normal, as is expected for the specified likelihood
and prior distributions. These figures are available upon request.
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degree centrality captures the diversity of the board. We also control for firm size proxied
by the number of plants it owns in a given year, and a firm’s influence in the market
using the firm’s eigenvector centrality. Following Khanna et al. (1998), we include a listed
firm dummy to capture the fact that publicly traded companies might behave differently
regarding environmental pressure.13 In the same spirit, we consider a BoardEx dummy,
which is equal to 1 if the facility belongs to a firm present in the BoardEx data (i.e., a
firm with a board of directors). Note that a firm in BoardEx can be listed or not. C
contains all firm-level variables, F controls for facility-level information. We include total
industrial toxicity (M) to capture industrial heterogeneity.
A facility’s probability to pollute depends on the demographic and geographic char-
acteristics of the area in which it is located. We, therefore, include a set of tract-level
variables (L). The demographic characteristics include median household income, minor-
ity ratio, college-education ratio, population density, and an indicator for facilities siting
in a special tract. Regarding the geographical characteristics, we control for tracts that
are part of an MSA, urban county, rural county, and coastal county, in addition to counties
located along the border with Canada and Mexico.
We estimate a facility’s probability of polluting using a simple probit model, which







f,t−1γ + χMi,t + L
′
l,tν + αf + τt + µf,j,i,l,t (2)
where facility f belongs to firm j from industry i, in location l at time t.
It is possible that the board’s past environmental characteristics are endogenous.
Hence, we first calculate the probability of each member being on the board in the current
year using estimates from Table 3 (Column 1) in the network formation analysis. Next,
we weigh each director’s pollution ratio by their calculated probability of being a member
of the board in a given firm at a given time. The expected board’s average pollution ratio
is obtained by computing the average of these ratios. We follow similar steps and create
a firm-level expected range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality.
Table 4 presents the marginal effects associated with the probit estimation of equation
(2). Our results for all facilities in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that, if a board has a
poor past pollution record, then it leads to a significantly higher probability of future
13In our facility- and board-level regressions, it is possible to use a listed dummy because observations
are not at the director level, but collapsed at the firm or board level.
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polluting incidents (testable hypothesis 4 ). By contrast, having a diverse board leads to
a lower probability of pollution incidents (testable hypothesis 5 ). Even though firms will
try to hire directors who share characteristics with their existing board members, this
last result shows that, once appointed, board diversity in terms of environmental records
has a positive impact on a firm’s environmental performance. If the facility belongs to an
industry reporting large amounts of toxic releases, then the facility has a higher probability
of release in any given year. Listed firms or firms in BoardEx have a lower probability of
polluting compared to non-listed/non-BoardEx firms. This is in line with our conjecture
that, because listed firms are accountable to their shareholders, they will be more conscious
about their environmental impacts. In Column 2, we re-estimate these results when we
endogenize the board’s past environmental characteristics. Our qualitative results hold.
In Columns 3 and 4, we report the results for BoardEx facilities only. Our main findings
are very similar. In Table 5, we estimate these models with facility-level random effects.
While the magnitude of the estimated marginal effects has decreased, the qualitative
findings have not changed.
4.2.2 Facility-level toxic releases
We now turn to the analysis of facility-level toxic releases. Here, our dependent variable
is the log of toxicity released and we estimate a linear regression model to evaluate the







f,t−1ϑ+ ξMi,t + L
′
l,tϕ+ αf + τt + ηf,j,i,l,t (3)
Tables 6 and 7 report the estimated results for all facilities and facilities that belong to a
firm in BoardEx, respectively. In Columns 1 and 3, we include firm-level fixed effects while,
in Columns 2 and 4, we control for facility-level unobservable heterogeneity by including
facility-level fixed effects. Further, Columns 3 and 4 are estimated with expected values
of the board’s past environmental performance. Note that, while we cannot include the
BoardEx dummy because it does not vary through time, we can use the listed dummy.
This variable is not necessarily constant for an individual firm. Indeed, our sample covers
17 years and firms can be listed or delisted over time.
Given that a board’s average pollution probability and the range of the board’s relative
pollution degree centrality takes the values between 0 and 1, it is intuitive to interpret
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these variables considering their marginal effects at the means. Hence, in Table 8, we
report the marginal effects at the means for all facilities (Panel A) and BoardEx facilities
(Panel B). We observe that a board with a poor average pollution ratio (or its expected
value) increases the amount of releases significantly (testable hypothesis 4 ). As it was the
case for the probability of polluting, a diverse board reduces the amount of a toxic release.
Similarly, listed firms tend to release less toxic chemicals than non-listed firms (testable
hypothesis 5 ).
In our dataset, many firms are not reporting any toxic release in a given year. As a
robustness check, we have left-censored the data for toxic releases per firm per year and
estimated our empirical models using censored regression techniques. We present these
results in Table A.7. As a reference point, in Columns 1 and 4, we report linear regression
results with industry controls. In Columns 2 and 5, we report results from censored
regression results similar to the ones estimated via linear regression. In Columns 3 and
6, we present censored regression results with facility-level random effects controlling for
facility-level unobservable heterogeneity. We report the results for all facilities in Panel A
and for BoardEx firms in Panel B. Our qualitative results hold.
5 Conclusion
This paper is the first study to analyze director network formation in firms reporting toxic
releases to the TRI Program. Studying director appointments allows us to endogenize the
effect of directors’ environmental performance when analyzing their impact on facility-level
pollution probability and toxic releases. We build a comprehensive dataset on director-firm
network and toxic releases in North America between 2000 and 2017.
Our analysis provides some important insights on the role of corporate governance
structure in internalizing increasing environmental pressures and affecting firms’ environ-
mental behavior. We show that firms are more likely to appoint candidates who are
similar to their existing board directors. These similarities include environmental perfor-
mance and influence. Firms are also more willing to appoint more experienced directors.
Interestingly, when a director becomes influential, poor environmental performance will
reduce their probability of being appointed. This implies that a director’s previous envi-
ronmental performance is a key factor that firms take into account when they appoint a
new director.
Additionally, our study shows that directors’ previous environmental performance af-
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fects their current facilities’ environmental performances. Appointing directors with good
environmental performance will help improve a firm’s environmental performance in terms
of lowering polluting probability and the amount of toxic chemicals released. This last
result suggests that the market could exert pressure on the influential directors to be
“greener,” which will have a spillover effect as influential directors spread their environ-
mental performance via their networks. The range of the board’s relative environmental
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Figure 1: Directors’ sub-network with a distance of 2
This graph shows a sub-network focusing on two directors among all directors who are connected to at
least one TRI firm for the year 2017. Red nodes represent the two directors. The brown nodes represent
polluting firms, and the green nodes represent clean firms. Blue nodes represent the other directors. A
distance of two means that we are representing all the nodes that are at a distance of at most two (two
edges) of the two directors (red nodes). Clean firms are defined as firms with no facilities releasing toxic
chemicals above the TRI threshold for a given year. This sub-network includes nine firms–three polluting
firms and six clean firms–with 69 directors. In our setting, directors’ environmental performance will be
a function of the past environmental performance of the firms they are connected. In this example, both
directors have two ‘pollution links’ as they are connected to two polluting firms. However, one director
serves on the board of three firms, while the other is connected to seven firms. The director serving on the
board of seven firms will be considered as having a better environmental performance.
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Figure 2: Directors’ sub-network with a distance of 4
Figure 2 presents the sub-network of the two most influential directors (same directors as in Figure 1)
among all TRI-related directors (represented by the red nodes) for the year 2017. Nodes’ color notations
are the same as in Figure 1. Compared to Figure 1, we expand the sub-network to include all the nodes at a
distance of at most four from the two most influential directors. With this increase in distance, the number
of nodes increases by 1,316, and the number of edges increases by 1,815. The comparison of Figures 1 and
2 provides some insight into the complexity and size of the network.
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Table 1: Matched summary statistics for regression sample: 2001-2017
Column 1 reports summary statistics for all the facilities used in the analysis. Column 2 and Column 3
show the information on facilities belonging to a firm with and without directors, respectively. All tracts are
based on 2010 US Census data. A ‘special tract’ is defined as a tract that does not have any demographic
information disclosed by the US Census. All the director’s network measures in Column 3 are equal to zero
because we don’t have board information recorded in BoardEx for those facilities. The Board’s average
pollution ratio is the average of the director’s pollution ratio. The expected board’s average pollution ratio
is obtained by weighing each director’s pollution ratio by their calculated probability of being a director
in a given firm at a given time and computing the average of these ratios. Using the same approach,
we create a firm-level expected range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality that captures the
board diversity in terms of environmental performance.
Variable Mean or count
Facilities
All With directors Without directors
Total number of observations (facility level) 582,722 288,277 294,445
Number of unique firms 19,035 2,873 16,162
Number of unique facilities 40,990 18,927 22,063
Unique number of directors 17,224 17,224 0
Number of unique tracts (locations) 18,183 8,420 9,763
Probability of polluting 0.532 0.530 0.534
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Total toxicity released by facility (in thousands of pounds) 121,538.2 151,601.5 92,104.72
(4,214,303) (2,212,775) (5,509,371)
Board’s average pollution ratio 0.178 0.359 0
(0.273) (0.293)
The range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality 0.215 0.435 0
(0.355) (0.399)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio] 0.091 0.182 0
(0.139) (0.149)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality] 0.110 0.221 0
(0.181) (0.203)
Firm’s influence (10−4) 0.057 0.114 0
(4.793) (6.813)
Number of plants per firm 27.692 51.082 4.791
(58.822) 76.018 11.390
Median household income 56,484.18 56,559.55 56,410.39
(23,104.16) (23,293.22) (22,917.36)
Minority ratio 0.231 0.232 0.229
(0.238) (0.237) (0.239)
College ratio 0.194 0.195 0.192
(0.172) (0.175) (0.168)
Population density 1,422.282 1,225.626 1,614.818
(2,538.237) (2,156.295) (2,850.125)
Facility belong to a firm with directors (BoardEx firm) 0.495 1 0
(0.500)
Facility belong to a listed firm 0.183 0.370 0
(0.387) (0.483)
Probability of locating in a special tract 0.014 0.016 0.012
(0.117) (0.127) (0.107)
The probability of a plant located in an MSA County 0.760 0.751 0.769
(0.427) (0.432) (0.421)
The probability of a plant located in an urban County 0.222 0.231 0.214
(0.416) (0.421) (0.410)
The probability of a plant located in a costal County 0.173 0.175 0.171
(0.378) (0.380) (0.376)
The probability of being located in a Mexico border County 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.096) (0.099) (0.093)
The probability of being located in a Canada border County 0.042 0.038 0.046
(0.200) (0.191) (0.209)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables used in the network formation analysis
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the network formation analysis. We create
a pool of candidates based on homophily measures and identify a possible 8,487,170 director-firm pairs for
all TRI-reporting firms with directors for all years. On average, this corresponds to about 300 potential
candidates per firm in a given. Column 1 presents summary statistics for all firms, while Column 2 provides
summary statistics for listed firms.
Variable Mean
All firms Listed firms
(1) (2)
Probability of creating a link 0.019 0.026
(0.137) (0.160)
Director’s past pollution ratio 0.446 (0.488)
(0.386) (0.368)
Director’s influence 0.0002 0.0002
(0.014) (0.014)
Director’s past pollution ratio × director’s influence 0.0001 0.0001
(0.009) (0.010)
Firm’s influence 0.0001 0.00003
(0.0021) (0.0014)
Difference in director’s relative pollution degree centrality respect to 0.324 0.338
other board members average relative pollution degree centralitya (0.299) (0.249)
Difference in director’s pollution ratio respect to firm’s 0.322 0.323
pollution ratioa (0.312) (0.280)
Difference in director’s influence and firms’s influencea 0.0003 0.0003
(0.014) (1.015)
Market exposure in years (number of years in BoardEx) 5.545 5.935
(4.506) (4.578)
a The homophily measures are given in absolute values. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Bayesian estimates of network formation parameters
The table displays the means of the posterior distributions for each network parameter affecting the
probability of forming a link between directors and firms at time t. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if
a director, in year t, becomes a member of the board. The independent variables used are lagged by one
year. The model was estimated using Bayesian MCMC technique based on a hybrid Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm with Gibbs sampling based on Equation (1). We use uniform priors for the regression coefficients
and an inverse gamma prior with shape and scale parameters of 0.1 and 0.1 for the error variance. In all our
Bayesian estimates, we use 10,000 iterations and omit the first 2,500 to mitigate possible start-up effects.
Column 1 reports the regression results for all firms in our sample, and Column 2 reports the regression
results for listed firms only. Influence is measured by eigenvector centrality measure. A candidate’s relative
pollution degree centrality is calculated as the proportion of pollution links relative to their total number
of links.
Parameter Variable Mean of the posterior distribution
All firms Listed firms
(1) (2)
ρ1 Director’s past pollution ratiot−1 -0.0002 -0.0139
[-0.0004, 0.0001] [-0.0144, -0.0134]
β1 Director’s influencet−1 0.0999 0.0997
[0.0994, 0.1003] [0.0917, 0.1078]
β2 Director’s past pollution ratiot−1× director’s influencet−1 -0.0529 -0.0627
[-0.0549, -0.0500] [-0.0692, -0.0555]
β3 Firm’s influencet−1 0.1200 0.4062
[0.1081, 0.1284] [0.3849, 0.4275]
ψ1 Difference in director’s relative pollution degree centrality respect to -0.0295 -0.0454
other board members average relative pollution degree centralityat−1 [-0.0298, -0.0291] [-0.0461, -0.0447]
ψ2 Difference in director’s pollution ratio respect to firm’s -0.0475 -0.0763
pollution ratio at−1 [-0.0478, -0.0475] [-0.0769, -0.0757]
ψ3 Difference in director’s influence and firm’s influencet−1 -0.0703 -0.0707
[-0.0717, -0.0687] [-0.0771, -0.0646]
δ1 Log(Market exposure in years) 0.0025 0.0033
[0.0024, 0.0026] [0.0030, 0.0035]
γ1 Trend Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,487,170 3,173,029
Log marginal likelihood 4,921,367 1,352,932
a The homophily measures are given in absolute values. 95% Credible intervals are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Pollution probabilities
This table presents the marginal effects associated with the probit estimation of Equation (2). All regres-
sions include log number of plants per firm, log of median household income, minority ratio, college ratio,
log of population density, and indicator for facilities siting in a special tract. Columns 1 and 2 report
results for all facilities, and Columns 3 and 4 report the results for BoardEx facilities only. In Columns 2
and 4, we re-estimate these results when we endogenize the board’s past environmental performance. We
weigh each director’s pollution ratio by their calculated probability of being a board member in a given
firm at a given time from Column 1 of Table 3. The expected board’s average pollution ratio is obtained
by computing the average of these ratios. Using a similar technique, we create a firm-level expected range
of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality.
Variable Probability of pollutingjt
All facilities BoardEx facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 0.480*** 0.483***
(0.004) (0.004)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.206*** -0.178***
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.003) (0.003)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t 0.943*** 0.950***
(0.008) (0.008)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.406*** -0.350***
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.006) (0.007)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 0.129 0.123 -1.036 -1.042
(1.501) (1.501) (1.477) (1.476)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Facility belongs to a BoardEx firmi,t -0.112*** -0.112***
(0.002) (0.002)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Located in a special tract Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA, Urban, and Costal County effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Located in a county that border Mexico or Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 582,722 582,722 288,277 288,277
Wald χ2 35,848 35,868 27,770 27,796
Log likelihood -382,584 -382,571 -183,699 -183,684
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Pollution probabilities – with facility level random effects
This table presents the marginal effects associated with the probit estimation of Equation (2). All regres-
sions include log number of plants per firm, log of median household income, minority ratio, college ratio,
log of population density, and indicator for facilities siting in a special tract. Columns 1 and 2 report
results for all facilities, and Columns 3 and 4 report the results for BoardEx facilities only. In Columns 2
and 4, we re-estimate these results when we endogenize the board’s past environmental performance. We
weigh each director’s pollution ratio by their calculated probability of being a board member in a given
firm at a given time from Column 1 of Table 3. The expected board’s average pollution ratio is obtained
by computing the average of these ratios. Using a similar technique, we create a firm-level expected range
of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality.
Variable Probability of pollutingjt
All facilities BoardEx facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 0.287*** 0.286***
(0.004) (0.004)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.054*** -0.041***
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.003) (0.003)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t 0.565*** 0.562***
(0.008) (0.008)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.106*** -0.080***
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.007) (0.007)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 0.911 0.903 0.812 0.804
(1.604) (1.604) (1.547) (1.547)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.095***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Facility belongs to a BoardEx firmi,t -0.098*** -0.098***
(0.005) (0.005)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Facility level random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA, Urban, and Costal County effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Located in a county that border Mexico or Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 582,722 582,722 288,277 288,277
Wald χ2 11,936 11,948 8,753 8,768
Log likelihood -246,373 -246,365 -114,886 -114,877
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Regression results for total release - all facilities
This table reports the OLS regression results for all facilities. The dependent variable is the log of total
toxic material released by a facility in a given year. All regressions include log number of plants per firm,
log of median household income, minority ratio, college ratio, log of population density, and indicator
for facilities siting in a special tract. In Columns 1 and 3, we include firm-level fixed effects; while, in
Columns 2 and 4, we control for facility-level unobservable heterogeneities by including facility-level fixed
effects. Further, Columns 3 and 4 are estimated with expected values of the board’s past environmental
performance.
Variable Log of toxicity releasedjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 1.326*** 1.575***
(0.139) (0.124)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.197** -0.166**
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.086) (0.082)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 2.609*** 3.098***
(0.274) (0.244)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.382** -0.321**
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.170) (0.163)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 25.410 24.806 25.366 24.753
(33.238) (33.650) (33.240) (33.653)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.351*** 0.269*** 0.351*** 0.269***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.240* -0.234* -0.240* -0.234*
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
Firm effects Yes Yes
Facility effects Yes Yes
Located in a special tract Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA, Urban, and Costal County effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Located in a county that border Mexico or Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 582,722 582,722 582,722 582,722
R2 0.462 0.725 0.462 0.725
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Regression results for total release - BoardEx facilities
This table reports the OLS regression results for facilities that belong to a firm in BoardEx. The dependent
variable is the log of total toxins released by a facility in a given year. All regressions include log number
of plants per firm, log of median household income, minority ratio, college ratio, log of population density,
and indicator for facilities siting in a special tract. In Columns 1 and 3, we include firm-level fixed effects;
while, in Columns 2 and 4, we control for facility-level unobservable heterogeneities by including facility-
level fixed effects. Further, Columns 3 and 4 are estimated with expected values of the board’s past
environmental performance.
Variable Log of toxicity releasedjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 1.504*** 1.742***
(0.136) (0.125)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.107 -0.088
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.082) (0.079)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 2.959*** 3.425***
(0.268) (0.246)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.204 -0.167
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.163) (0.156)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 25.211 24.859 25.160 24.801
(33.289) (34.123) (33.293) (34.128)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.384*** 0.270*** 0.384*** 0.270***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.272** -0.278** -0.272** -0.278**
(0.133) (0.134) (0.133) (0.135)
Firm effects Yes Yes
Facility effects Yes Yes
Located in a special tract Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA, Urban, and Costal County effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Located in a county that border Mexico or Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 288,277 288,277 288,277 288,277
R2 0.361 0.762 0.361 0.762
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Regression results for total release - marginal effects at the mean
This table reports the marginal effects at the means for all facilities in Panel A and BoardEx facilities
in Panel B. For all facilities, the mean of the board’s average pollution ratio is 0.178, the mean of the
range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality is 0.215, the mean of the expected board’s average
pollution ratio is 0.091, the mean of the expected range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality
is 0.110, and the mean of firm’s influence is 6.667× (10−6). For BoardEx facilities, the mean of the board’s
average pollution ratio is 0.360, the mean of the range of the board’s relative pollution degree centrality is
0.435, the mean of the expected board’s average pollution ratio is 0.183, the mean of the expected range of
the board’s relative pollution degree centrality is 0.221, and the mean of firm’s influence is 1.14 × (10−5).
To calculate the marginal effect of a variable, we multiply the coefficient from the OLS regressions on a
facility’s total release (shown in Tables 6 and 7) of each variable by its corresponding mean.
Variable Log of toxicity releasedjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All facilities
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 0.236*** 0.280***
(0.025) (0.022)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.042** -0.036**
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.018) (0.018)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 0.236*** 0.280***
(0.025) (0.022)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.042** -0.035*
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.019) (0.018)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Panel B: BoardEx facilities
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 0.540*** 0.626***
(0.049) (0.045)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.047 -0.039
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.036) (0.034)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 0.541*** 0.626***
(0.049) (0.045)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -0.045 -0.036
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.036) (0.035)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)




Table A.1: TRI facility level summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics at the facility level for the TRI
dataset. The data are obtained from the US EPA’s TRI program between
2000 and 2017. This paper includes all mandatory TRI reporting facilities
in the US. Not all facilities in the TRI dataset are necessarily releasing
toxic chemicals.
Variable Mean or count
Number of unique firms 19,915
Number of unique facilities 42,212
Average number of plants per firm 2.242
(7.575)
Average toxicity per facility (in thousands of pounds) 124.680
(4,200.330)
Average polluting ratio by firm 0.434
(0.301)
Average polluting ratio by facility 0.532
(0.499)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.2: TRI data summary statistics
This table summarizes the TRI data for each year from 2000 to
2017. The data are obtained from the US EPA’s TRI program.
This study includes all mandatory TRI reporting facilities in the
US. Not all facilities in the TRI dataset are necessarily releasing
toxic chemicals.
Year Unique number of Toxicity
Facilities Firms per facilitya
2000 36,486 16,987 186.224
2001 36,209 16,739 158.446
2002 35,653 16,240 137.118
2003 35,405 15,969 129.340
2004 35,131 15,793 123.292
2005 35,019 15,591 127.551
2006 34,848 15,441 127.876
2007 34,647 15,286 122.698
2008 34,394 15,108 115.639
2009 33,853 14,905 101.518
2010 33,939 14,994 113.424
2011 33,808 14,952 122.743
2012 33,916 14,934 108.545
2013 33,908 14,944 123.510
2014 33,926 14,979 117.881
2015 33,958 14,953 102.088
2016 34,067 15,079 103.128
2017 34,394 15,194 115.684
a In thousands of pounds.
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Table A.3: TRI industry sector data summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics about toxic releases for different industrial
sectors in the TRI dataset. The data are obtained from the US EPA’s TRI pro-
gram between 2000 and 2017. This study includes all mandatory TRI reporting
facilities in the US. We use the industrial sectors defined by the TRI program.
Industry Sector Unique number of Toxicity
Facilities Firms per facilitya
Apparel 16 21 2,231.71
Beverages 76 164 46,502.84
Chemical Wholesalers 259 812 1,858.80
Chemicals 3,002 5,925 98,599.44
Coal Mining 95 179 86,867.46
Computers and Electronic Products 1,360 2,191 4,362.11
Electric Utilities 329 888 1,008,985.10
Electrical Equipment 519 1,149 9,116.14
Fabricated Metals 3,326 5,515 18,232.35
Food 885 2,741 54,218.04
Furniture 384 646 17,865.09
Hazardous Waste 88 360 662,878.39
Leather 73 90 18,458.95
Machinery 1,028 2,119 5,422.72
Metal Mining 66 128 13,383,882.00
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 533 836 15,244.63
Nonmetallic Mineral Product 871 3,840 15,163.07
Other 376 1,237 58,112.79
Paper 345 755 396,704.74
Petroleum 376 1,161 137,381.63
Petroleum Bulk Terminals 318 1,024 3,436.34
Plastics and Rubber 1,598 2,627 29,018.49
Primary Metals 1,472 2,612 355,596.27
Printing 210 378 42,681.02
Publishing 15 18 373.39
Textile Product 58 112 3,332.00
Textiles 209 324 11,068.16
Tobacco 19 53 92,041.75
Transportation Equipment 1,271 2,647 31,907.57
Wood Products 610 1,352 17,537.35
a In thousands of pounds.
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Table A.4: BoardEx firm level summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the BoardEx dataset. BoardEx is a global data
management firm specializing in relationship mapping and intelligence. This study uses
the BoardEx dataset for North America. A polluting firm is defined as a firm with at least
one facility releasing toxic material above the EPA’s threshold in a given year.
Variable Mean or count
Number of unique firms 157,997
Number of unique directors 119,607
Average number of directors per firm 2.518
(3.012)
Director’s’ average existing period in BoardEx 10.624
(5.684)
Average term of a director in a firm 5.560
(4.668)
Director’s probability of being a board member in a polluting firm 0.049
(0.217)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.5: BoardEx data summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the BoardEx data from
2000 to 2017. BoardEx is a global data management firm specializing
in relationship mapping and intelligence. This study only uses the
BoardEx dataset for North America.




















Table A.6: U. S. Census tract level summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the US Census data set provided by the
United States Census Bureau. We also obtain population density information
created by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Given that
our data spans two census periods, we use 2010 locations as fixed geographic
locations. As in De Silva et al. (2016, 2021), we linearly impute and estimate the
missing data to estimate the population density, minority ratio, the proportion
of individuals with a college degree, and median household income from 2000 to
2008.
Variable Mean or count
Number of unique tracts (based on 2010 Census data) 73,082
Total population 4,133.523
(1,878.227)
Population density (per square mile) 5,165.112
(11,482.190)
Number of households 1,039.065
(507.029)






Number of special tracts 961
Tract is located in a Mexico border County 1,521
Tract is located in a Canada border County 2,933
Tract is located in an MSA County 60,909
Tract is located in an urban County 10,569
Tract is located in a rural County 1,604
Tract is located in a costal County 20,628
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Censored linear regression results for total release
This table reports censored linear regression results for total releases. We have left-censored the data for
toxic releases per firm per year and estimated our empirical models using censored regression techniques.
Columns 1 and 4 are the reference points that report linear regression results with industry effects. Columns
2 and 5 report results from censored regression similar to the ones estimated via linear regression. Columns
3 and 6 report censored regression results with facility-level random effects controlling for facility-level
unobservable heterogeneity. We report the results for all facilities in Panel A and for BoardEx firms in
Panel B. All regressions include log number of plants per firm, log of median household income, minority
ratio, college ratio, and log of population density in addition to indicators for facilities siting in a special
tract, MSA, Urban, and Costal Counties, located in a county that border Mexico or Canada, industry
effects, and time effects.
Variable Log of toxicity releasedjt
All facilities
OLS Censored OLS Censored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All facilities
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 3.604*** 3.875*** 3.128***
(0.211) (0.033) (0.049)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -1.365*** -1.598*** -0.403***
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.228) (0.028) (0.048)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 7.084*** 7.614*** 6.148***
(0.414) (0.064) (0.096)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -2.688*** -3.143*** -0.779***
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.450) (0.055) (0.095)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 -22.758 -12.857 28.525 -22.770 -12.881 28.412
(23.492) (12.105) (21.297) (23.482) (12.105) (21.297)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.241*** 1.059*** 2.442*** 0.241*** 1.059*** 2.441***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Facility belongs to a BoardEx firmi,t -0.659*** -0.869*** -0.807*** -0.659*** -0.869*** -0.808***
(0.151) (0.019) (0.094) (0.151) (0.019) (0.094)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.143 -0.210*** -0.388*** -0.141 -0.208*** -0.389***
(0.149) (0.021) (0.054) (0.149) (0.021) (0.054)
Facility level random effects Yes Yes
Observations 582,722 582,722 582,722 582,722
R2 0.128 0.128
Log likelihood -1.252e+06 -994,300 -1.252e+06 -994,295
Uncensored observations 310,227 310,227 310,227 310,227
Panel B: BoardEx facilities
Board’s average pollution ratioj,t−1 3.540*** 3.834*** 3.150***
(0.205) (0.033) (0.048)
The range of the board’s relative pollution -1.146*** -1.358*** -0.293***
degree centralityj,t−1 (0.223) (0.029) (0.047)
E[Board’s average pollution ratio]j,t−1 6.957*** 7.535*** 6.191***
(0.402) (0.066) (0.093)
E[The range of the board’s relative pollution -2.254*** -2.670*** -0.562***
degree centrality]j,t−1 (0.440) (0.057) (0.093)
Firm’s influencej,t−1 -30.907 -21.736* 28.036 -30.924 -21.766* 27.915
(22.519) (12.205) (20.641) (22.507) (12.205) (20.640)
Log of total industrial toxicityi,t 0.264*** 1.071*** 2.304*** 0.264*** 1.070*** 2.303***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.040) (0.033) (0.045) (0.040)
Facility belongs to a listed firmi,t -0.114 -0.172*** -0.404*** -0.112 -0.171*** -0.405***
(0.140) (0.021) (0.054) (0.140) (0.021) (0.054)
Facility level random effects Yes Yes
Observations 288,277 288,277 288,277 288,277 288,277 288,277
R2 0.168 0.168
Log likelihood -616,971 -478,887 -616,963 -590,056
Uncensored observations 152,861 152,861 152,861 152,861 152,861 152,861
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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